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Notes and Comments
OBSCENITY '73:
Something Old, A Little Bit New,
Quite a Bit Borrowed, But Nothing Blue
[T/he Greek delegate (too Socratic by half) suggested that
it might be a good thing to establish a preliminary definition
of the word "obscene." Sir Archibald Bodkin sprang to his
feet with a protest. "There is no definition of indecent or
obscene in English Statute Law." The law of other countries
being, apparently, no more explicit, it was unanimously de-
cided that no definition was possible. After which, having
triumphantly asserted that they did not know what they
were talking about, the members of the Congress settled
down to their discussion.I
Operating in a somewhat similar definitional vacuum, the
Supreme Court re-examined its position on obscenity' and set
forth the results of its efforts to "formulate standards more con-
crete than those in the past," in a series of five opinions handed
down on June 21, 1973: Miller V. California;3 Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton;4 United States v. Orito;5 Kaplan v. California;'
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film.7 The purpose of this
Note is to examine the new guidelines and, by comparison of
these guidelines to the previously defined standards, to indicate
what, if any, real changes have been made.
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, VULGARITY IN LITERATURE 1 (1930), describing a Geneva confer-
ence on the suppression of the traffic in obscene publications.
2. The legal commentators, just as the Justices, have had a field day with obscenity,
as attested to by the almost endless literature on the subject. One of the most extensive
surveys of the area is Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure
(1954)1, supplemented six years later by Lockhart & McClure, The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure
(1960)1.
Informative treatments of the topic can also be found in Kalven, The Metaphysics of
the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter cited as Kalveni; Katz, Privacy
and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 203; Krislow, From Ginzburg
to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. CT. REV.
153; and Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 7
[hereinafter cited as Magrath[.
3. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
5. 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
6. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
7. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Speaking for the same five-Justice majority' which prevailed
in all five of the cases, Chief Justice Burger offered in Miller the
most extensive explanation of the Court's current reasoning on
obscenity.9 Reflecting upon the "somewhat tortured history of the
Court's obscenity decisions,"'" Chief Justice Burger noted,
"[W]e are called on to define the standards which must be used
to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without
infringing on the First Amendment as applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment."" In summary, the result-
ing standard reaffirms the principle that obscene material is not
protected by the first amendment, and it confines
the permissible scope of such regulation to works which de-
pict or describe sexual conduct . . . [as] specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law, [and it limits the regula-
tion] to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the pru-
rient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a pat-
ently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'
The Court specifically excluded from its newly announced stan-
dard the old "utterly without redeeming social value" test 3 and
asserted that factual determinations of obscenity are to be made
by reference to contemporary community standards, not national
8. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
White; Justice Douglas dissented in all of the cases except Kaplan primarily on his long-
standing position that there should be no exceptions to the protection offered freedom of
expression by the first amendment. In Kaplan, he would have vacated and remanded for
dismissal on the ground that the criminal statute's definition of obscenity was too vague
to satisfy the requirements of due process. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Stewart, dissented in all five cases on the basis that the obscenity statutes were
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See discussion infra at note 24.
9. Miller was convicted of mailing unsolicited, sexually explicit material in violation
of a California statute that approximately incorporated the obscenity test formulated in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (as noted in the Miller opinion, 413
U.S. at 16-17). The jury was instructed to evaluate the materials by the contemporary
community standards of the State of California. 413 U.S. at 31. Miller appealed to the
Court, claiming that the incorrect community standard had been used.
10. 413 U.S. at 20. "Tortured history" is a mild description, compared to some
commentators' evaluations. See, e.g, Magrath, supra note 2, at 59: "The Court has turned
the law of obscenity into a constitutional disaster area."
11. 413 U.S. at 19-20. A corollary problem of the attempt to define "obscenity" is
the vagueness of any such definition. See discussion infra at note 24.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. The Court also rejected what it called the "ambiguous concept of social
importance." Id. at 25 n.7.
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standards.'4 In order to understand fully the thrust of the new
test, an analysis of each of the elements of that test is necessary.
Roth Reaffirmed
Perhaps seeking to build upon past solidarity, an all too un-
common characteristic of the Court's history in obscenity litiga-
tion,'5 the majority in Miller chose to continue its adherence to
the holding originally set forth by Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority in Roth v. United States,'" that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."'"
This principle has been widely criticized'" since it first appeared
in Roth, primarily because the Court offered no more analytical
justification for its holding than that:
[aill ideas having even the slightest redeeming social im-
portance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of
more important interests. But implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance."
14. Id. at 37.
15. The decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), was a majority
opinion. Between the two touch-stone decisions of Roth in 1957 and Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), there were no majority opinions in cases concerning obscenity.
The prevailing opinion in Memoirs was adhered to by only 3 Justices. See text accompany-
ing note 85 infra.
16. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This was the first time the Supreme Court had been called
on to decide whether obscenity was within the area of constitutionally protected speech
and press. Id. at 481. In finding that it was not, the Court offered what has come to be
known as the Roth test for obscenity: "[Wjhether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489. Roth dealt with the constitutionality of a federal
criminal obscenity statute. The companion case of Alberts v. California dealt with the
constitutionality of a state criminal obscenity statute, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
17. Id. at 485.
18. E.g., H.M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 23-43 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as CLOR]; PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP, OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 150-51
(1961); Lockhart & McClure (1954), supra note 2, at 387; Note, A Look at Thought
Control: Obscenity in the Eyes of the Supreme Court, 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 649, 658 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Thought Control].
19. 413 U.S. at 20, citing 354 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). This justification was
in part derived from the historical premise that the first amendment was not intended by
the Framers to protect every type of speech. To the Roth majority, a desire that obscenity
not be protected was clearly manifested in eighteenth century America's distaste for libel,
blasphemy, and profanity-and in the colonial and state statutes prohibiting these utter-
ances. See discussion, 354 U.S. at 482-84.
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Apparently, the Miller Court was content to rely upon the
implicit exclusion of obscene material"0 from protected expres-
sion, for it merely restated the Roth rationale; the Court added
only that while "[tihe protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bring-
ing about of political and social changes . ..1 the public por-
trayal of hard core sexual conduct, for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter."2 The Court
In addition, the Roth majority's justification was derived from the reasoning of a prior
Supreme Court decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which
the Court first declared that certain types of speech are excepted per se from the protec-
tion of the first amendment. In that case, "fighting words" were deemed to fall within
this exception, words, which the Roth majority considered to be similar to obscene utter-
ances because both "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality." 354 U.S. at 485, citing 315 U.S. at
571-72. Implicit in this excerpt from Chaplinsky, is a recognition of the metaphysical
validity of these utterances. Balanced against the possibly disruptive effect upon non-
appreciative fellow citizens, the paucity of rational communication and any non-rational
content of such utterances are insufficient to warrant constitutional protection. Query
whether this balancing is now carried through to the determination of obscenity or if it
ever was in the prior determination of obscenity based on a finding of the absence of any
redeeming social value. See discussion infra at note 88.
20. Citing Roth, the Court noted that the judicial meaning of "obscene material" is
limited to that "which deals with sex." 413 U.S. at 18-19 n.2.
21. Id. at 34-35.
22. Id. at 35. The Miller opinion cited Roth for the proposition that "the stern
nineteenth century American censorship of public distribution and display of material
relating to sex .. .in no way limited or affected expression of serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific ideas." 413 U.S. at 35, citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-85, and social
histories, 413 U.S. at 35 n.16. Thus, the Court indicates that this concept of the first
amendment, as implemented in laws and judicial action, did not impede the fullest and
freest operation of speech as envisioned by the Framers.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, the Court transformed the purpose
behind the first amendment-the protection of and the fostering of the interchange of
ideas-from a mechanism for defining obscenity to a rationale for permitting the states
in certain circumstances, some of which are arguably private, to regulate obscenity in the
hands of consenting adults, non-consenting adults, and juveniles. See 413 U.S. at 61 n. 12.
The Court discounted the possibility that such regulation leads to thought control, by
blithely observing that obscenity communicates no thought.
At first glance, both the statement in Miller and the intended purview of the Paris
Adult Theatre I holding are limited to the public display of obscenity in a commercial
setting. The Miller quote contrasts communication that merits first amendment protec-
tion with pornography displayed for its own sake and for the ensuing commercial gain (a
quote from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth, in which he limited his
agreement with the Roth majority to the context of commercial exploitation of obscenity).
Id. at 35 & 15. It is reasonable to infer from the Miller opinion that a public display of
sexually oriented works by an artist, who is later determined to have exhibited obscene
materials, may not be proscribed. However, in Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 68-69,
the Court stated that permissible state regulation extends to obscene material which is
publicly exhibited or to commerce in this material. The Court therefore appears to con-
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never explained why expression describing sex should be treated
in a different manner than that dealing with politics, science,
education, and other matters. It merely reaffirmed the assump-
tion that sexual expression has always been subject to different
first amendment considerations. 3 By having failed either to
abandon or to substantiate its prior reasoning, the Court remains
vulnerable to continued criticism of its approach to the most
fundamental question-why is obscenity excluded from the pro-
tections of the first amendment?" Until this question is ade-
done the possible criminal prosecution of a putative artist's "obscene" works which are
publicly exhibited.
23. Id. at 23. This distinction between "obscenity" and "other expression" has be-
come known as the "two-level approach." For an evaluation and criticism of this different
treatment of obscenity, see CLOR, supra note 18, at 27; Magrath, supra note 2, at 10; Note,
First Amendment: The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1257,
1260 (1969); Note, Obscenity: The Lingering Uncertainty, 1972 N.Y.U. REv. LAW & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 6; Thought Control, supra note 18, at 655; and Note, Still More Ado About
Dirty Books, 81 YALE L.J. 309, 310 (1971).
The inherent "bootstrap" approach that colors any rationale for the lack of constitu-
tional protection of obscenity has not deterred a majority of the Court from extending the
scope of criminal laws that regulate it. In Roth, the majority found it unnecessary to
determine whether obscene material "will perceptibly create a clear and present danger
of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct." 354 U.S. at
486. But in Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court held that, because obscenity is not constitu-
tionally protected, a state legislature, exercising its police power to bar the public sale of
obscene publications to consenting adults, could determine that obscene material is rea-
sonably likely to "adversely affect men and women or their society," 413 U.S. at 60, and,
in particular, that it "has a tendency to endanger the public safety," Id. at 69. The
unsubstantiated hypotheses that the Roth majority deemed irrelevant to a decision about
the constitutional protection of obscenity have now become suggested operative assump-
tions, still unproven, which tip the scale in favor of majority rule of individual taste.
24. For a general discussion of the more basic question of why the government
should legislate in the area of morals and of the relationship of this question to obscenity,
see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Henkin]; Thought Control, supra note 18.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), a case dealing with a film shown
only to consenting adults, provides the context for an articulation by the dissenting Jus-
tices of their views of obscenity and the first amendment. Justice Douglas, in the same
approach to the problem that he has taken since the Roth decision, characterizes the
obscenity exception to the first amendment as a "legislative and judicial tour de force,"
and concludes that obscenity should be given full first amendment protection. Id. at 71.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart, accepts for the sake of
argument the majority's premise that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment.
However, he characterizes the approach to obscenity that has prevailed since Roth as
"unable to bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First
Amendment values," and states that a new, more constitutionally sound approach must
be found. Id. at 73-74. Justice Brennan's dismay is a result of his view that any regulation
of obscene material is void for vagueness because of the inherent inability to define
obscenity effectively without thereby proscribing protected speech. Id. at 83. Within this
flaw, he identifies three specific problems: the inevitable failure to provide prior notice of
the definition of a standard; the nearly infinitesimal breadth of any definition of unpro-
tected speech so as to provide the necessary breathing space for constitutionally protected
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quately dealt with, the Court's efforts in the area of obscenity will
continue to suffer from a lack of basic constitutional underpin-
ings.
Obscenity: Depiction of Sexual Conduct as Defined by State Law
Recognizing the legitimate State interest in prohibiting dis-
semination or exhibition of obscene materials," the Court sought
to minimize the inherent dangers involved in regulating any form
of expression" by narrowly confining the "permissible scope of
such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct
. . .specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written
or authoritatively construed.""
speech; and the institutional stress upon the Supreme Court, in terms of the number of
cases, the case-rooted determination of the obscenity of particular matter, and the inabil-
ity of lower courts to implement this area of the law without exceptional interference from
appellate courts. Id. at 86-92.
Brennan's call for abandonment of the Roth approach is not reached by a visceral
reaction to these problems, but by the logical elimination of various alternatives. The first
alternative, denying constitutional protection to all sexually oriented speech, he de-
nounces as inconsistent with the first amendment; the second, redefining the standards
of obscenity, he brands a hopeless task, dependent upon the personal outlook of the judge
and the context of the exhibition of the material; the third, abandoning appellate review,
he believes, would only compound the problem for the lower courts; the fourth, granting
first amendment protection to obscenity would be too radical a route to take. Id. at 93-
103.
In order to justify any infringement of protected speech, Justice Brennan seems to
fall back on a balancing test and insists at a minimum upon the existence of a strong
countervailing state interest, two examples of which he deems to be the protection of
juveniles and of non-consenting adults to whom obscenity is offensively presented. 413
U.S. at 113. It should be noted that Justice Brennan reserves judgment concerning the
constitutionality of such a statute until faced squarely with the issue, id. at 114 n.29, and
hints that at that time he might depart from the majority's premise and not deny first
amendment protection to sexually descriptive material which is directed to juveniles and
non-consenting adults. Id. at 85-86 n.9.
In the interim, Justice Brennan would declare most, if not all, existing statutes void
for vagueness. He took this tact in Miller. See 413 U.S. at 47-48. However, he would also
permit the states to regulate the manner of presentation of obscenity, which would not
involve total suppression of obscene material. Id. at 113.
25. 413 U.S. at 18-19. The Court specifically noted the traditionally recognized state
interest "when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending
the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles." Id.
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 24. In so confining the scope of regulation, the Court excluded violence as
conduct which might be deemed obscene for the purpose of state regulation. It could be
argued that explicit portrayals of violence are more harmful and offensive to the public
than exposure to materials dealing with sexual conduct. However, given the "sexual
conduct" restriction of Miller, the states will have to look elsewhere to find their power to
control such portrayals.
Later on in the Miller opinion, the Court noted that there are two other protective
devices in the drawing of the fragile Roth line dividing constitutionally protected speech
19731 OBSCENITY '73
The effect of this portion of the Miller decision on individual
state statutes remains to be seen; it is highly probable, however,
that vast revision will be necessary. This view was reflected by
Justice Brennan, when he stated that the Court's action may
prove sufficient to invalidate virtually every state law relat-
ing to the suppression of obscenity. . . .It seems highly
doubtful to me that state courts will be able to construe state
statutes so as to incorporate a carefully itemized list of var-
ious forms of sexual conduct, and thus to bring them into
conformity with the Court's requirements.28
Chief Justice Burger specifically discounted the value of Justice
Brennan's prediction by citing in Miller two examples of state
laws regulating "depiction of defined physical conduct, as op-
from obscenity. The first device is the availability of the jury trial, "accompanied by the
safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumptions of innocence and other protective
features provide as . . . with rape, murder, and a host of other offenses against society
and its individual members." 413 U.S. at 26. However, the subjective nature of the
standards which are the essence of the alleged crime-possession of obscene mate-
rial-surely undermines these safeguards. The other protective device is the availability
of appellate review, discussed infra at notes 95 to 98 and accompanying text.
Query whether the intended result in Miller offers any more first amendment protec-
tion than that rendered by a broad definition of obscenity which does not contain a specific
description of the sexual conduct to be regulated. If a state, for example, were to restrict
only depictions or descriptions of intercourse, this specificity would give notice to potential
dealers in material that depicts or describes this conduct. However, if, as the Supreme
Court in Miller indicates, a state may permissibly regulate all otherwise obscene depic-
tions or descriptions of sexual conduct, then a state that does so will possibly be giving a
person no more notice and certainly no more freedom from possible criminal prosecution
than before.
28. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 95 n.13 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). At least one state supreme court's action has reflected Justice Brennan's reasoning.
In State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464 (La. 1973), the defendant was
charged with violating a state statute by intentionally possessing, with intent to sell,
exhibit, give, and advertise, a magazine which was obscene as defined by LA. REv. STAT.
§ 14: 106(A) (Supp. 1973), which reads as follows:
Obscenity is the intentional:
(2) Production, sale, exhibition, gift, or advertisement with the intent to primarily
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, of any lewd, lascivious, filthy
or sexually indecent written composition ....
The defendant challenged the statute on the grounds of vagueness and lack of specificity
as required by the recent Supreme Court obscenity decisions. The State urged the court
to incorporate into the statute the two examples offered by the majority in Miller (see note
38 infra) in order to provide the requisite specificity. Noting that the two examples were
in "pure obiter dictum" in Miller, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the state's
argument and concluded that "it would be an unconstitutional usurpation of the legisla-
tive function for us [the court] to engraft these limiting two examples into a broad,
general statute which clearly conveys the obvious legislative intention to prohibit many
other 'offensive representations or descriptions.' " 287 So. 2d at 470.
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posed to expression," 9 which would comply with the Court's spe-
cificity standard. It should be noted, however, that the two exam-
ples are recent revisions of state efforts to define proscribed
29. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6.
30. Id. ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.060 (1971), and Hawaii Penal Code, Tit. 37 §§ 1210-
1216, 1972 Hawaii Session Laws, pp. 126-129, Act 9, Pt. II. The relevant portions of each
are as follows:
ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.060 (1971):
(5) "Nudity" means uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, post-pubertal
human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female breast below a point
immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered human male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is consid-
ered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and the areola only are covered.
(6) "Obscene performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, show or other
presentation, whether pictured, animated or live, performed before an audience and
which in whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excite-
ment or sado-masochistic abuse, or which includes obscenities or explicit verbal
descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual conduct.
(7) "Obscenities" means those slang words currently generally rejected for regular
use in mixed society, that are used to refer to genitals, female breasts, sexual
conduct or excretory functions or products, either that have no other meaning or
that in context are clearly used for their bodily, sexual or excretory meaning.
(9) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a person who
is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition
of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so
clothed.
(10) "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any
touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or
the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or oppos-
ite sex or between humans and animals in an act for apparent sexual stimulation
or gratification.
(11) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female genitals
or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
Hawaii Penal Code: Tit. 37 § 1210, Definition of terms.
(5) "Pornographic." Any material or performance is "pornographic" if all of the
following coalesce:
(a) Considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest in
sexual matters. In determining predominant appeal, the material or performance
shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults, unless it appears from the charac-
ter of the material or performance and the circumstances of its dissemination that
it is designed for a particular, clearly defined audience. In that case, it shall be
judged with reference to the specific audience for which it was designed.
(b) It goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or
representing sexual matters. In determining whether material or a performance
goes substantially beyond the customary limits of candor in describing or represent-
ing sexual matters, it shall be judged with reference to the contemporary standards
of candor of ordinary adults relating to the description or representation of such
matters.
(c) It is utterly without redeeming social value.
(7) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, lesbianism, bes-
[VOL. XXXIII
19731 OBSCENITY '73
material, and one of the examples, the Oregon statute, is rather
atypical in that, as Justice Brennan noted,31 it prohibits only the
distribution of obscene material to nonconsenting adults or to
juveniles. Other states' statutes are less recent and more inclusive
in scope, and they more probably would require at least some
legislative or judicial revision for them to be brought in line with
the new requirements.3 2
This revision, if required to meet the specificity standard,
can be made either by legislative enactment3 3 or by authoritative
construction by the courts.3 4 Given the vague state statutory lan-
guage which is most often used to provide for the regulation of
obscenity, 5 at least initially, the job of revising the existing stat-
tiality, sexual intercourse or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed
genitals, pubic areas, buttocks, or the breast or breasts of a female for the purpose
of sexual stimulation, gratification, or perversion.
(8) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of the human male or female genitals
when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(9) "Sadomasochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a person as
an act of sexual stimulation or gratification.
It should be noted that, while Oregon's law may exemplify a specific definition of
"sexual conduct," it may be unconstitutionally overbroad in part because it proscribes
more than conduct. Depictions of "nudity" are regulated by the statute even though the
term "nudity" is clearly defined in the statute in a non-active mode. See ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 167.090 (1971) (public display of nudity or sex for advertising purposes).
31. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. 40, 95 n.13. However, the Oregon statute was
amended in 1973 so that persons are prohibited from "disseminating obscene material."
See Ore. Laws 1973, c. 699, § 1.
32. For a review of the federal and state regulations of obscenity, see THE REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 380-94 (1970).
Depending upon the definitiveness of its efforts, a legislature may find itself in the
trap of creating obscene material in order to prohibit it-indeed, the new state statutes
may take on the character of the Legislator's Guide to the Seven Sexual Sins, and thus
become the most sought after literary work since Lady Chatterly's Lover. See, e.g., the
anti-obscenity ordinance of an Indiana municipality which was deemed to be "obscenity
itself" by a newspaper publisher who refused to publish it. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 28, 1973,
§ A. at 7, col. 1.
33. For a somewhat dated but no less relevant discussion of the problems inherent
in the enactment of obscenity legislation, see ALI-ABA, THE PROBLEM OF DRAFTING AN
OBSCENITY STATUTE (1961).
34. 413 U.S. at 24.
35. The statutory law of obscene literature is peculiar. Though obscenity is
one of the most elusive and difficult concepts known to the law, legislative bodies
have seldom made any effort to provide a workable definition of the term. Instead,
the typical statute or ordinance begins with the word "obscene" and continues with
a st ring of synonyms selected haphazardly from the following list: disgusting, filthy,
immoral, improper, impure, indecent, lascivious, lewd, licentious, suggestive, and
vulgar. But the additional epithets have made little or no difference in judicial
interpretations of the statutes and ordinances; their draftsmen might just as well
have contented themselves with the single word "obscene." And in the few instan-
ces in which legislatures have attempted statutory definitions of obscenity, the
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utes will most likely fall to the courts. While noting that it "must
leave to state courts the construction of state legislation... ,,3
the Court did state that it would authoritatively construe federal
statutes dealing with obscenity37 to limit the material regulated
to "patently offensive representation or descriptions of that spe-
cific 'hard-core' sexual conduct given as examples38 in Miller v.
California . . . . ",31 It is conceivable that the state courts could
adhere to the letter of the law and obtain the necessary specificity
by merely incorporating by reference the Supreme Court's two
examples; the spirit of the Supreme Court's mandate, however,
seems to require a more comprehensive treatment than that af-
forded by a sub silentio incorporation often found in state court
obscenity opinions.
Even though the Court did give two examples of what type
of state statutory definition would suffice under the new stan-
dard, the examples themselves seem to be lacking in specificity,
in that they are replete with totally subjective words such as
"ultimate acts," "lewd," and "normal or perverted."" Indeed,
definitions they have devised are not likely to be any more useful than a string of
synonyms.
In consequence, courts confronted with concrete cases for decision are left to
work out for themselves their own meaning for obscenity, with little or no guidance
from the legislature.
Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in The Courts, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 587 (1955). This
Lockhart & McClure article is one of a series in the excellent Symposium on Obscenity
and The Arts (begins id. at 531).
36. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7.
37. Id. See notes 51, 120 & 122 infra.
38. 413 U.S. at 25:
(a) Patently offensive acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
39. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n7.
40. In Paris Adult Theatre I, Justice Brennan noted the definitional vagueness of
"lewd" and "ultimate" sexual acts, 413 U.S. at 99. The inherently ambiguous nature of
these terms is evident from the Miller majority's second example, which includes in part
the lewd exhibition of genitals. Justice Brennan was quick to seize upon the vagueness of
this physical conduct test. In particular, he characterized as nearly impossible an a priori
determination of whether such exhibition is "lewd," and extrapolated this conclusion from
the previous "valiant attempts" of one lower federal court to draw the constitutional line
at depictions of sexual conduct. 413 U.S. at 99. However, the author of that "valiant
attempt," (United States v. Huffman, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Honorable
Harold Leventhal, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Circuit, has recently noted that the Miller majority's "circularity is not always an evil"
and that, even after the Miller decision, only depictions of "unmistakable sexual arousal"
are possibly obscene. The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59 A.B.A.J.
1261 (Nov. 1973).
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some states have defined "lewd" to mean obscene, and this pres-
ents the situation of specifically defining "obscene" as "that
which is obscene." This result would offer no more "concrete
guidance" than past efforts.4
Average Person and Contemporary Community Standards
Once again defining the "new" standard by using the lan-
guage from the "old," the court relied on the wording, if not the
reasoning, of Roth to hold that the determination of obscenity is
to be made by reference to the "average person, 'applying con-
temporary community standards' . . not national standards."42
41. For criticism of the uncertainties remaining after Roth, see R.H. KUH, FOOLISH
FIGLEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY IN AND OUT OF CoURT 41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KUH]; and
Magrath, supra note 2, at 90.
42. 413 U.S. at 30, 37 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489, on 413 U.S. at 37).
Some question remains concerning the proper application of the "contemporary com-
munity" standard to the three elements of the basic guidelines: prurient interest, patently
offensive, and serious "value."
The only reference to the "contemporary community" in the technical presentation
of the guidelines (413 U.S. at 24) is contained in the prurient interest element, and it is
clear that whatever the proper community-local, state, or national-the determination
of the appeal to the prurient interest is by reference to that specific community. Id. The
propriety in using the "contemporary community" standard to ascertain patent offensive-
ness and serious "value" is less certain, as no reference to these standards is included in
either a technical presentation of the guidelines or within these two specific elements
themselves. It seems probable that the defined "contemporary community" standard was
intended to be used in determining all three of the requirements; however, the Court's
ambiguous phrasing in the initial presentation of the guidelines precludes a definite inter-
pretation. Other portions of the Miller opinion indicate that the element of patent offen-
siveness (which by definition is based on the mores and social norms of a group of people)
is to be determined by the "contemporary community." Id. at 30.
If the serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value of the material is to be
determined by reference to the community's sense of serious value, far more than Pan-
dora's Box will have been opened if the local community's views are determined to be the
proper standard. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, probable
jurisdiction noted, 94 S. Ct. 719 (1973), where the film "Carnal Knowledge" was found to
be obscene after having been shown in Albany, Georgia, a community located 145 miles
south of Atlanta. The film had previously been exhibited in major American cities and in
many of the cities and towns of Georgia without any legal efforts to have it judged obscene.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Georgia did not specifically review the soundness of
the finding of any of the three required elements for obscenity. However, since the material
must meet all of the elements, it can be assumed that the court concluded that the film
lacked serious artistic value. This disposition prompted one of the dissenting judges to
warn against "the grave danger to free speech and expression inherent in the ... tacit
approval of small towns and hamlets as being the 'community' from which the standard
for obscenity is drawn .... See also Price v. Commonwealth, discussed at note 60 infra.
The Jenkins case is noteworthy in other respects. Neither the majority nor the dissent
felt obligated to "read into" the Georgia statute any specified instances of sexual conduct.
The majority apparently judged the movie not on the basis of its predominant theme, but
on the basis of a few isolated instances of nudity and sexual conduct. Finally, the majority
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The "average person" element was originally added in Roth43
as a more rational substitute for the standard set forth in Regina
v. Hicklin," which "allowed material to be judged merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
persons." 5 Although the application of this average person stan-
dard has been criticized" as a wholly artificial exercise, it has
been retained in every Court-devised obscenity standard since
Roth. It has been adjusted at least once by the Court, in Mishkin
v. New York.47 To facilitate the determination of obscenity where
the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
"clearly defined deviant sexual group . . ."48, the Court in
Mishkin allowed the material's appeal to the prurient interest "to
be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and
probable recipient group," 9 i.e., the average sexual deviant. 0
upheld the use of a public indecency statute both to form the basis of the criminal
prosecution and to provide the standards for an "obscenity" conviction.
43. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966): "[Tlhe concept of the 'average'
or 'normal' person was employed in Roth to serve the essentially negative purpose of
expressing our rejection of that aspect of the Hicklin test, Regina v. Hicklin, [18681 L.R.
3 Q.B. 360, that made the impact on the more susceptible person determinative." Id. at
509. However, the Court in Roth also noted a positive purpose - that the impact of the
allegedly obscene material is to be gauged by reference to those whom it is likely to reach,
the average person in the community. 354 U.S. at 490. At this point, the Roth opinion
quotes from the instructions given by the trial judge in that case, which express the theory
that
the test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires in those comprising a particu-
lar segment of the community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish, or
would leave another segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called-
worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved.
Id. Thus, the rationale of the Court, while perhaps not fully implemented by any legal
test, is that obscenity is not protected speech because the reaction of the ordinary man to
obscene material in certain ways characterizes it as obscene. An absolutist position, which
excepts obscenity from the protection of the first amendment because of a failure to
promote public intellectual progress, requires that there be a truly public litmus of
obscenity.
44. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
45. 354 U.S. at 488-91.
46. See KuH, supra note 41, at 34-36; Lockhart & McClure (1960), supra note 2, at
71-75.
47. 383 U.S. 502 (1966). Mishkin was convicted of employing others to write obscene
books, and of publishing and selling the books which dealt predominantly with sadoma-
sochism, fetishism and homosexuality. On appeal, Mishkin contended that the books did
not satisfy the prurient interest requirement of the obscenity standard, in that, rather
than appealing to the prurient interest of the average person, the books sickened and
disgusted him. The Court rejected this imaginative argument.
48. Id. at 508.
49. Id. at 509.
50. Some commentators have argued that this approach is a return to the old
Hicklin "most susceptible person" standard. Lockhart & McClure (1960), supra note 2,
at 73; Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1398 (1960). However, the
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Other than this exception, the standard has consistently been
taken to refer to the average man-on-the-street, whose attitudes,
the Court assumes, will be shared by the triers of fact-either the
lay jury or the trial judge.
Again echoing Roth, the guidelines set forth by the Court in
Miller to assess the prurience and offensiveness of the work re-
quire that the trier of fact apply "contemporary community stan-
dards." The majority in Roth made no effort to define what that
particular phrase meant, and it was not until 1962 in Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,' that the Court attempted to define the
relevant community whose standards of decency must be utilized
in determining the obscenity issue.5" While leaving undefined the
technicalities of how and by whom this standard was to be deter-
mined, the Court in that case concluded that "the proper test
under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the
United States whose population reflects many different ethnic
and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency.' ' 1
Court in Mishkin noted that the recipient group must be defined with more specificity
than "sexually immature persons." 383 U.S. at 509.
51. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). The Post Office Department, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1461
(1970) (the statute that deals with "[mjailing obscene or crime-inciting matter"), had
barred from the mails magazines designed to appeal primarily to male homosexuals. The
dispositive issue in the court of appeals was the propriety of assessing the appeal to the
prurient interest in terms of the average person as opposed to the average homosexual.
The Supreme Court did not reach that issue, but decided the case on the basis of patent
oltensiveness. The relevant sections of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 are as follows:
Section 1461. Mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter.-Every obscene,
lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance;
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails
or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or
delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly causes
to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly
takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing
thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such
offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
The term "indecent," as used in this section includes matter of a character
tending to incite arson, murder, or assassination.
52. 370 U.S. at 488.
53. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Manual Enterprises specifically
refused to consider whether Congress could constitutionally prescribe a standard that
derives from the social mores of the residents of a geographical area. smaller than the
entire United States. 380 U.S. at 488.
A forced resolution of that issue may now be imminent. In United States v. Thevis,
484 F.2d 1149 (1973), the Fifth Circuit held that material which was not "utterly without
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The Court's first attempt to define the appropriate standard
to be used in dealing with state statutes came two years later in
Jacobellis v. Ohio. 4 Justice Brennan, speaking for a sharply di-
vided Court,5 declared that a national community standard must
also be applied in state obscenity prosecutions:
We do not see how any "local" definition of the "com-
munity" could properly be employed in delineating the area
of expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution. 6
.We thus reaffirm the position taken in Roth to the
effect that the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene
work must be determined on the basis of a national stan-
redeeming social value" lacked serious literary merit. Implicit in the fact that an expert
was not required to testify with regard to this element of the Miller guidelines (which
would be necessary if the standards were those of the national community) was a disregard
of the use of national standards. However, the determination with respect to the prurience
and offensiveness of the material involved was the same under the Miller test as under
the Memoirs test. This indicates that, at least with very hard core pornography, there is
not much of a difference in result when a national or a local standard is used. See, e.g.,
the Fifth Circuit's comparision of the testing of various magazines' obscene character
under the Memoirs and the Miller standards, infra at 435, found at 484 F.2d at 1156.
Chief Justice Burger noted in Miller that the imposition of a national community
standard upon state obscenity actions could result in the banning of material that would
be found tolerable in the area of intended receipt. 413 U.S. at 32 n.13. But, would criminal
prosecutions of the distributors of such material be undertaken in the locality? Other
interesting questions will surely be debated in the context of the philosophy of the Court
that the states should be free, within constitutional limit, to ban obscenity. Could the
federal government, using a national community standard, under the Miller guidelines,
seize material in interstate commerce that is intended for distribution in a state such as
Oregon or Hawaii, which does not ban the material?
54. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Jacobellis had been convicted by an Ohio state court for
exhibiting an obscene motion picture, "Les Amants," in violation of a state obscenity law.
55. The Court split six ways, with only Justice Goldberg joining in Justice Brennan's
prevailing opinion, although he also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice White
concurred in the judgment of Justice Brennan.
56. 378 U.S. at 193. In a somewhat garbled fashion, the Court attempted to impute
to the author of the Roth opinion a familiarity with "contemporary community standards'
as a term of art in legal history. The Court noted that the term was first used in United
States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), an opinion authored by Judge
Learned Hand, in which he posited the concept of obscenity as a societal concept, not
restricted to the populace of any one political unit. 378 U.S. at 192-93. Chief Justice
Warren, in dissent, maintained that as a matter of "plain meaning," the term "com-
munity standards" could not be used to connote national standards. Id. at 200.
The two policy arguments of the prevailing opinion are much more convincing. The
first argument was that the community generally cuts across local political boundaries.
To give a concrete example of this position, it would be arbitrary to expect a jury in
Baltimore City to fail to take into account the mores of the Baltimore metropolitan area.
The second argument was that banning material in one community would deter distribu-
tion in other, possibly more liberal communities. In contemporary legal jargon, there
would be an impermissible restriction of constitutionally protected free speech.
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dard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expound-
ing. 5 7
This position was immediately criticized by Chief Justice War-
ren, who stated that Roth did not mandate a national standard,
and that indeed "there is no provable 'national standard' and
perhaps there should be none . . . and it would be unreasonable
to expect local courts to divine one . . . [when] this Court has
not been able to enunciate one.""8
Faced with this division of judicial opinion, the Court in
Miller held that the trial court's instruction to the jury that a
state community standard be applied was permissible59 and that
obscenity is to be determined against contemporary community
standards, not national standards. In so doing, the Court was only
partially successful in providing more definite guidelines for all
to follow. What it- did clarify is that national standards are not
required, at least in litigation involving state statutes. Also ap-
proved is the use of "state community standards" 0 in cases in-
volving violations of state statutes. At least two areas, however,
remain unclarified: the standards to be used in federal obscenity
statute violations and those to be used in situations involving
violations of local obscenity regulations.
Prior decisions had definitely established that a standard
based on a national community had to be applied in federal ob-
scenity cases.' Nevertheless, given the specific disapproval of a
national standard in Miller, and the assertion in 12 200-Ft. Reels
that the Miller "standards are applicable to federal legisla-
tion," the appropriate community standard on which to base
a federal determination of obscenity is less than clear. Even more
troublesome is the problem of ascertaining the proper base com-
munity from which to derive a standard when a local obscenity
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 200-01 (Warren, C.J. and Clark, J., dissenting).
59. 413 U.S. at 31.
From the wording of the instruction to the jury, it is also evident that these com-
munity standards were applied to both the "prurient interest" element and to the "pat-
ently offensive" element of the obscenity standard. See id. at 31.
60. Id. The Court was assuming that views of what is obscene do vary from state to
state, and possibly within the state. The actual existence of these variable concepts was
reflected in Price v. Commonwealth, - Va. __, 201 S.E.2d 798 (1974), where the
court, emphasizing that intra-state disparities result from local citizens serving on juries,
upheld the use of local standards in a prosecution under a state obscenity statute. The
rationale of the Virginia Supreme Court was that in light of the statement in Miller
dealing with city and state diversity, the use of local standards in obscenity prosecutions
is permissible.
62. 413 U.S. at 130.
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regulation is involved. 3 This confusion was created by the Court
when, in explaining the need for diverse standards, it fell into the
trap of comparing apples and oranges: "It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept depiction of con-
duct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City." 4 If the
Court were advocating that only state standards should be used,
why did it compare states with cities? It can be argued that the
Court meant only to justify state-wide standards-especially in
view of its explicit approval in Miller of the state community of
California.15 In light of the treasured rights involved in freedom
of expression, however, this Court-created confusion can only
lead to more serious problems in an area already characterized by
chaos.
Appeal of the Work, Taken as a Whole, to Prurient Interest
In requiring that a work be considered in its entirety in deter-
mining whether or not it is obscene, the Miller court continued
the precedents set forth in United States v. One Book Called
Ulysses," Roth, and Jacobellis, which had rejected the old
63. In several instances of local prosecution of allegedly obscene materials, the
courts have cavalierly implemented the Miller standards. In Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726,
199 S.E.2d 183, probable jurisdiction noted, 94 S. Ct. 719 (1973), a five justice majority of
the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld appellant's conviction for the exhibition of the film
Camel Knowledge. The court simply stated that Miller permits juries to consider state or
local community standards.
In Redlich v. Capri Cinema, 347 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1973), the state brought suit to enjoin
the exhibition of an allegedly obscene film. The Supreme Court, Special Term, New York
County, held that the statute which authorized the injunctive procedure was void for
overbreadth, and that the statute which defined obscenity was also overbroad. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of New York held that the film was hard core in the eyes of the average
person in New York City, County; and State. Disregarding the scrupulous and methodical
approach of the lower court to an interpretation of the obscenity statute, the Court held
that it could be and would be construed in light of Miller to preserve its constitutionality.
149 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1973). See also Price v. Commonwealth, which upheld the Virginia
criminal obscenity statute against the contention that it was unconstitutionally over-
broad. The Virginia Supreme Court noted that because a prior Virginia case held that "a
portrayal of nudity is not, as a matter of law, a sufficient basis for a finding that a work
is obscene," the statute was specifically authoritatively construed within the meaning of
the Miller decision.
The prosecutions in Miller and in Kaplan occured in Los Angeles County, California,
but involved a California statute. Similarly, the injunctive proceedings in Paris Adult
Thatre I involved the alleged violation of a Georgia statute by an Atlanta theatre. Given
the fact that the Supreme Court in Miller differentiated between the tastes of individuals
of New York City or Las Vegas, and those of Maine or Mississippi, query whether the scope
of the community must be delimited to the political unit in which the material is seized.
64. 413 U.S. at :32.
65. Id. at 34.
66. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
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Hicklin rule that allowed a work to be judged on the basis of
isolated excerpts;' 7 in general, decisions must be based on a ra-
tional consideration of the entire work and its theme, not upon
an isolated profanity or explicit narrative or scene."8
The "prurient interest" portion of the standard, a recurring
element in all of the Court's obscenity decisions, first appeared
in the Roth decision where it was used to define obscene material
as that "which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest,""' that is, "material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts."' While not elaborating on the meaning of the word
"prurient,"'" the Court in Miller apparently accepted the efforts
of Justice Brennan, quoting, in Roth, Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary, to provide a definition of "prurient": "itching;
longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching,
morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, of propensity,
lewd .... ,7 That definition, and its silent acceptance in Miller,
still suffers from the most common weakness in the judicial treat-
ment of obscenity-subjectivity. As aptly expressed by one legal
commentator, "[I]t tells us what obscenity-pruriency allegedly
does to the viewer of obscene material; it does not inform us what
obscenity is. ' 7:3
Patently Offensive
By restricting the operation of obscenity statutes to situa-
tions where the sexual conduct is depicted or described in a "pat-
ently offensive way," the Miller Court continued to "borrow from
the old." In this instance, however, it was not Roth, but Manual
67. See text accompanying notes 36 to 38 supra.
6(. This element of the standard has had some criticism. See CLOR, supra note 18,
at :12: KuH. supra note 41, at 38.
69. :354 U.S. at 487.
70). Id. at n.20. The variety of stimuli which could incite "lustful thoughts" is almost
infinite. A representative sampling of these stimuli is contained in a questionnaire which
was sent to "college and normal school women graduates. . . .In answer to the question
of what things were most stimulating sexually, of the 409 replies, 9 said 'Music,' 18 said
'Pict ures.' 29 said 'Dancing,' 40 said 'Drama,' 95 said 'Books,' and 218 noted very simply
'Man.' " Alpert, Judicial ('ensorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REV. 40, 73 (1938).
71. See CLoR, supra note 18, at 33-34, for a comparison of the Roth definition with
that contained in The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code: "a shameful or mor-
hid interest in sex, nudity or excretion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No.
6. 1957).
72. :54 U.S. at 487 n.20, citing Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.,
unalbridged 1949).
73. Magrat h, supra note 2, at 11 n. 19. Justice Brennan focused on this subjectivity
in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 97-98.
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Enterprises that contributed to the new standard. In Manual
Enterprises, Justice Harlan asserted that if materials
cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront
current community standards of decency-a quality we shall
hereafter refer to as "patent offensiveness" or "indecency"
.. [they] cannot be deemed legally "obscene," . . . . Ob-
scenity . thus requires proof of two distinct elements: (1)
patent offensiveness; and (2) "prurient interest" appeal. 4
While unconvincingly asserting that the Roth test included
both these elements all along, 5 Justice Harlan succeeded in
granting first amendment protection to works which would have
been unprotected under the old singular "prurient interest" test
of Roth.7" This widening of the area of constitutionally protected
expression was a direct result of the application of the two-fold
standard, for, under it, a work can have an infinite appeal to
prurient interest, but unless it is also patently offensive it cannot
be legally judged obscene."
74. 370 U.S. at 482, 486.
75. The Justice asserts that the Roth decision established the "patent offensive-
ness" concept no less than the "prurient interest" concept. But his opinion does
not succeed in revealing just where in the Roth case this concept is to be found. Its
endeavors to do so are ambiguous. Justice Harlan maintains that the expression
"prurient interest" was "but a compendious way" of embracing both tests. But it
is most difficult to discover "patent offensiveness" in the Roth terminology which
sets forth "prurient interests."
CLOR, supra, note 18, at 63-64.
However, Justice Harlan's assertion may be justified if the Roth decision is viewed
in the context of Anglo-American case law dealing with obscenity. The Regina v. Hicklin
decision has been interpreted by the Commonwealth courts to contain a two pronged test
for obscenity. The requirement of "patent offensiveness" derives from the precise meaning
of "obscene" as that which is "offensive to current standards of decency, and not things
which may induce to sinful thought." 370 U.S. at 484. Viewing the rationale of the Su-
preme Court in Roth both as an acceptance of the common law definition of obscene
(except for the "most susceptible person" element) and as an attempt to define obscenity
standards in order to make them constitutionally impeccable, Justice Harlan concluded
that the "appealing to the prurient interest" standard in Roth was merely a shorthand
expression for the two pronged test.
This linguistic analysis retains some viability after Miller. Chief Justice Burger noted
that what may be constitutionally proscribed is material that deals with sex-technically
"pornography"-rather than obscenity, which is defined as that which disgusts. 413 U.S.
at 18 n.2. Although much of the post-Roth case law on obscenity has been swept aside by
Miller, this statement of the Chief Justice both bases the "patently offensive" element in
Roth and provides some explanation for its retention.
76. The result, explains Kuh, was to "set the law of obscenity running around in
circles." KUH. supra note 41, at 37-58.
77. Justice Harlan noted that without the "patent offensiveness" standard, the
American public might be denied access to many worthwhile works of literature, science,
or art:
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Again, the Court's silence in Miller" forces reliance upon the
assumption that the concept of patent offensiveness outlined in
Manual Enterprises is the one adopted in Miller. Without further
explanation from the Court, it can also be assumed that the criti-
cism719 directed toward the inherently subjective nature of the
standard will continue as in the past.
Lack of Serious Value
It is easier to concentrate on what was rejected rather than
on what was accepted as the final element of the Miller standard,
if for no other reason than that the discarded "redeeming social
value" test has been more widely utilized and discussed than the
new "lacks serious value" test. As noted by Chief Justice Burger
in a short historical narrative"' in Miller, the rejected standard
was first mentioned in Roth as a premise for denying constitu-
tional protection to obscenity. In Roth Justice Brennan stated
that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties [of the
first amendment]. . . . But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without re-
deeming social importance."'" Seven years later, in Jacobellis,
Justice Brennan again emphasized that "any . . . form of social
importance" would prohibit the exclusion of a work from the
protection of the first amendment. At the same time, however, he
declared that constitutional protection could not "be made to
turn on a 'weighing' of its social importance against its prurient
appeal ... 3 By Jacobellis standards, then, for a work to be
deemed obscene, it must appeal to prurient interests and be ut-
For one would not have to travel far even among the acknowledged masterpieces
in any of these fields to find works whose "dominant theme" might, not beyond
reason. he claimed to appeal to the "prurient interest" of the reader or observer.
Just ice Harlan then declined to attribute to Congress any such quixotic and deadening
imor)ose as would bar from the mails all material, not patently offensive, which stimulates
impure desires relating to sex. 370 U.S. at 487.
78. Unlike its treatment of the "appeal to prurient interest" element (which was
attributed to Rtoth), the Court did not cite Manual Enterprises. See 413 U.S. at 24.
79. See Ct.oR supra note 18, at 67; Magrath, supra note 2, at 11; Thought Control,
supra note 18. at 659-60.
80. 413 U.S. at 20-23.
81. :354 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
82. 178 U.S. at 191.
8:1. Id. For criticism of this elimination of the balancing test in situations involving
works with only slight social value, see Frank, Obscenity: Some Problems of Values and
the I ,se of Experts, 41 WASH. L. REV. 631, 664 (1966).
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terly without redeeming social importance."
While the dual requirements of prurient interest and utterly
without social importance were specifically adhered to in
Jacobellis by only Justices Brennan and Goldberg, the later case
of Memoirs v. Massachusetts"5 brought at least the social import-
ance element full circle from a reason for denying first amend-
ment protection in Roth, to a prerequisite which must be estab-
lished before a work can be judged obscene and thus be denied
the protections of the first amendment. Justice Brennan, joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, announced the opin-
ion of the Court in Memoirs:
Under [the Roth] definition [of obscenity], as elaborated
in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must
be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contempo-
rary community standards relating to the description or rep-
resentation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value."
Adding that "[e]ach of the three federal constitutional criteria
is to be applied independently,"87 the Court continued to adhere
to the reasoning from Jacobellis that a weighing of the elements
against one another is not permitted.
Unfortunately, the wording itself-utterly without redeem-
ing social value-is semantically incongruous," and the failure of
the Court to give any guidance for the application of the standard
has only encouraged criticism both by members of the bench and
by legal commentators. In view of this criticism and the convo-
luted history of the standard, the Court's decision to abandon it
84. "jAj work cannot be proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social import-
anue." 378 U.S. at 191.
85. 383 U.S. 41: (1966). John Cleland's book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,
('omm)nly known as Fanny Hill, was judged obscene by a Massachusetts trial court. The
decision was aflirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court
reversed.
86. Id. at 418.
87. Id. at 419.
88. As to the incongruity in wording: "utterly" is an absolute concept; it
recognizes no middle ground, no compromise; "redeeming," on the other hand, is
the essence of compromise; it intimates a variable amount...; "importance" too
is a word of degree. The phrase "utterly without redeeming social importance"
thus juxtaposes an absolute concept against. two variables. What, then, is its mean-
ingn?
Kilit. supra note 41, at :39.
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is not surprising. 9
An evaluation of the results of this abandonment may prove
to be somewhat mixed, however, because arguably the Court has
succeeded only in disguising the old standard in a set of new
words: "Taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."'90 Indeed, in Jacobellis, the Court referred to
"literary or scientific or artistic value, or any other form of social
importance."91 The four itemized values seem merely to be sub-
categories of an all-encompassing social value.
While clearly noting that "no Member of the Court today
supports the Memoirs formulation,"92 the Court itself virtually
reproduces the Memoirs language to describe its newly an-
nounced standard: "At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive
depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amend-
ment protection."93 In substance, how does this differ from
89. See, e.g., Bender, The Obscenity Muddle, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Vol. 246, No.
147:8, Feb. 1973:
It appears that a new crisis in the law of obscenity is upon us. [In attempting to
deal with the crisis, the Court] will likely permit the use of local-rather than
national community standards of offensiveness. It may relieve prosecutors of the
burden of affirmatively proving that a work is prurient, offensive, or valueless (and
permit the jury to make that decision on the basis of the work alone). And it could
easily hold that some redeeming value does not automatically insulate a work from
the law, but that value must merely be weighed in determining pruriency and
offensiveness.
Id. at 46. 51.
90t. 413 U.S. at 24.
91. 378 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
92. 413 U.S. at 23.
93. Id. at 26. The Court also gave the example of a graphically illustrated medical
book for the education of medical personnel as indicative of certain types of depiction of
sexual conduct which would not be obscene. Id. This example raises the question of the
relevance of the size, function, and educational level of the anticipated audience. Edu-
cated individuals ironically may provide a stricter definition of serious. Furthermore "seri-
ous" could be construed to mean that which is not comic so that comedy which involves
sexual conduct may be prohibited.
However, the Court has made at least one step towards implementing a working
detinition of "lacks serious literary value." In Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 116 (1973),
the Court upheld the determination of a state court that an unillustrated book was ob-
scene. Framing the issue as being "squarely... whether expression by words alone can
be legally obscene," id. at 118, the Court held that the book's content was obscene.
T here)y, the Court intentionally qualified its stated premise that "a book seems to have
a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be," on the
basis oft he "hard core" nature of the material presently before it. Id. at 118-19. However,
the Court also recognized that prior Supreme Court cases dealing with unillustrated
material had "rigorously scrutinized" lower court decisions and had regularly reversed all
convictions therein. See extensive citations listed in 413 U.S. at 118 n.3.
Nevertheless, this is the first decision of the Supreme Court, since Roth, in which the
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Memoirs? If there is a material difference, it is difficult to per-
ceive how this new standard can be of any assistance in clarifying
matters, when it is based on so subjective a term as serious. How
is this seriousness to be judged and by whom? 4 Indeed, if there
('ourt has failed to give tacit approval to constitutional protection of unillustrated books.
Perhaps here, the difference between the "utterly without redeeming social value" and
"lacks serious literary value" standards can be seen. Compare Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
.:K I.S, 41:, 419 (1966), in which the Court noted that the Massachusetts court had found
soime minimal value in the unillustrated book before the court, and used this state finding
to illustrate the extreme "debasity" to which the "utterly without redeeming social value"
standard must go.
In Millhr, t he Court gave an example of what would not be considered "serious literary
value": A quotat ion from Voltaire in the flyleaf of... an otherwise obscene publication
.413 U.S. at 25 n.7, citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972). This earlier
obsceoity case also provides a clue as to what "serious literary value" means. In Kois, the
('ourt held that a sex poem, which was one of eleven poems in an inside two page spread
of an underground newspaper, was not obscene. Acknowledging that the poem was an
"undisguisedly frank, play by play account of the author's recollection of sexual inter-
course." the Court cited Roth for the proposition that not every literary portrayal of sex
is obscene. Then, stating that a reviewing court must look at context as well as content,
the C(ourt held that "it bears some of the earmarks of an attempt at serious art." Signifi-
cantlv. while the Court noted that "many would conclude that the author's reach ex-
ceeded his grasp," the standard used was whether the dominant theme of the material
appealed to the prurient interest. Id. at 231-32. Thus, the Court, in a per curiam opinion
in which Chief Just ice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined, acknowledged that
an atteml)t at serious art would not be something that appeals to the prurient interest.
This approach may be justified in that surely poetry could be found to have some redeem-
ing social value under the Memoirs test, but it does bear on the meaning of "serious
literary value" and leads to the conclusion that contextual, as well as textual, considera-
tions must be used by the jury and by reviewing courts. Hopefully, the Court will explicate
this-especially the necessity that the work as a whole be obscene-in its disposition of
-Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, probable jurisdiction noted, 94 S.Ct.
116 1 i.S. (197:t), which involves the so called obscene film "Carnel Knowledge."
Kois also involved a newspaper printing of two pictures, which were similar to ones
seized in a police raid. accompanying a story of the arrest of the publisher of the paper.
The Court held that it did not have to decide if the pictures appealed to the prurient
interest because, quoting Roth, all matters which are of public concern are protected.
94. This problem has been a recurring one in obscenity litigation, especially with
regard to the literary merits of a work. "To those who place a high value upon literary
qualities, the censorious are philistines. To the censorious, on the other hand, literary
qualit ies are suspect - they serve only to make the obscene palatable and, therefore, all
the more insidious and dangerous." Lockhart & McClure, supra note 35, at 602. Justice
Brennan. in dissent, took a dim view of this "old wine in new bottles" approach. As he
notes. the Court's approach necessarily assumes that some works will be deemed ob-
scene-even though they clearly have some social value-because the State was able to
prove that the value, measured by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently "seri-
ous" to warrant constitutional protection. 413 U.S. at 97. In practice, he adds, the prosecu-
tion may find it as difficult to prove a "lack of serious literary value" as to prove that the
material is "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 98. However, in the watershed
case of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), a finding of fact was made that
Fonny Hill has a nominal amount of social value.
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is a new standard, it may prove as elusive and difficult to apply
as the old one.
Appellate Review
Having outlined the basic standards for permissible state
action in regulating obscenity, the Court emphasized its belief
that adherence to the guidelines would offer adequate protection
of first amendment rights. To be doubly sure that freedom of
expression would not suffer, the Court stressed that there always
remained the ultimate power of appellate courts to review consti-
tutional claims when necessary."
While admitting that the courts have been overly burdened"
in their role as Super Censor, the Court seemingly perpetuates
the problem by maintaining the vague standards, as outlined
above, which often, if not inevitably, lead to a final decision in
the individual cases only at the Supreme Court level.97 Thus, the
Court seems to concede that the "institutional stresses,"98 re-
ferred to by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre
I, are inherent in the area of obscenity litigation and that its
recent decisions will do nothing to overcome them.
Hard Core Only?
It should be noted that, while placing great stresses on defin-
ing what standards a state must use in regulating obscenity, the
Court repeatedly made use of the term "hard core" pornogra-
phy.9 At one point, Chief Justice Burger summarized the Court's
accomplishments in Miller as agreeing upon "concrete guidelines
95. 413 U.S. at 25.
96. "It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a single majority view of
this Court as to proper standards for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state
and federal courts." Id. at 29.
97. One problem which seems inherent in the new approach is the issue of the
effect iveness of independent judicial review of local or state community standards. It is
possible that a jury verdict will be conclusive on the issue of community standards, and
therefore the retention of the right to judicial review would be meaningless for at least
that element of the standard. See O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court:
A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964).
98. Paris Adult Theatre !, 413 U.S. at 91.
99. 413 U.S. at 27, 28, 29, 35, 36. There have been recurring suggestions in prior
decisions of the Court that only "hard core" pornography can constitutionally be regulated
(see discussion of Justice Douglas, dissenting in Miller, id. at 39). See, e.g., Manual
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. at 489 (Harlan, J., for the Majority); and Jacobellis v. Ohio,
:378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.
2d 578. 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961), which still provides the seminal defini-
tion of "obscenity" in New York).
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[that] isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected
by the First Amendment."''0 In a footnote involving the authori-
tative construction of federal statutes, he referred to the Court's
two examples of specific conduct as "hard core."'' If the Court
meant to equate hard core pornography with obscenity and to
permit regulation and suppression of "hard core" material only,
its intention should have been explicitly stated. This concept has
been advocated'' many times by members of the bench and the
legal community, and perhaps this "hard core only" approach"
is what the Court in Miller had intended to adopt. But in face of
the interchanging use of the terms "obscenity" and "'hard core'
pornography," it is almost impossible to determine the Court's
real intent.' 4 Even if it were intended to be a "hard core" only
standard, this would be of little assistance, as the term "hard
core" itself is incapable of precise definition. Perhaps the only
way to know what the Court means is to follow the advice of one
commentator and ignore what they say and look at what they
do. 05
For all its efforts to clarify, the Court in Miller seems to have
precisely defined only two concerns in obscenity litigation - that
a national standard is not required when applying "contemporary
community standards" in a case involving a state statute and
that specificity of proscribed conduct is required in obscenity
regulation. Other than these, the uncertainties of the old guide-
lines remain.
OBSCENITY: EXPERT WITNESSES, PRIVATE POSSESSION, COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS
Having set forth in Miller its new general guidelines for the
100. 41:3 U.S. at 29.
101. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 130 n.7.
102. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 2, at 43; Magrath, supra note 2, at 71.
103. Professors Lockhart and McClure have concluded that that is the concept
which has been held by most members of the Court all along. Lockhart & McClure (1960),
supra note 2, at 60.
104. While the Court asserted that, as a result of the Miller decision and its four
companion cases, "no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual
conduct," 413 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added), it should be noted that the term "hard core"
is not included in the exact standards and guidelines set forth in the opinion, (Id. at 24)
and the only reference to it occurs in obiter dictum. See also 413 U.S. at 36 and note 99
s 'pra for the statement that the new guidelines ban "hard core" pornography.
105. Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue -
What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289, 292 (1961). See also Note, Obscenity and the Right
to be Let Alone: The Balancing of Constitutional Rights, 6 IND. L. REv. 490, 491 (1973).
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regulation of obscenity by the states, the Court, in its four com-
panion decisions, dealt with several recurring problems in obscen-
ity litigation: the use of expert witnesses, the boundaries of the
zone of constitutional protection which surrounds the private pos-
session of obscene material, and the interests of the state and
federal governments in prohibiting obscenity from entering the
stream of commerce. While an in-depth analysis of each of these
areas is beyond the scope of this note, a review of the actions in
these cases will provide the reader with a summary of the current
stance of the Court.
Expert Testimony
The majority's holdings in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton'06
and Kaplan v. California"7 indicate a reversal of a growing trend
of judicial opinion which required that expert testimony be used
in defining "contemporary community standards" in order to sat-
isfy procedural due process. The Court, citing Ginzburg v. United
States, 's8 asserted that since the material, once placed in evi-
dence, "can and does speak for itself," 09 the necessity for expert
testimony is obviated.
The requirement of expert testimony has been based on the
belief that "community standards of the psychological or physio-
logical consequences of questioned literature" cannot be estab-
lished except through the use of experts."" With the emphasis in
Miller that the trier of fact is the best judge of the contemporary
106. In Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), Slaton sued to enjoin the exhibi-
(ion biy Paris Adult Theatres of two allegedly obscene films. In a jury-waived trial, the
trial court (which did not require "expert" affirmative evidence of obscenity) viewed the
films and (lismissed the complaints on the ground that the display of the films in commer-
cial theatres to consenting adult audiences (reasonable precautions having been taken to
exclude minors) was "constitutionally permissible." The Georgia Supreme Court re-
versed. holding that the films constituted hard core pornography not within the protection
of the first amendment.
107. In Kaplan, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), the proprietor of an "adult" bookstore was
c(vietled of violating a California obscenity statute by selling a plain-covered unillus-
trated b)ook which contained repetitively descriptive material of an explicitly sexual na-
ture. Both sides ollered testimony of the nature and content of the book, but there was
no "expert" testimony that the book was "utterly without redeeming social importance."
The trial court used a state community standard in applying and construing the statute.
The appellate court, affirming, held that the book was not protected by the first
am end ment.
108. 383 U.S. 46:1, 465 (1966).
109. Paris A dult 'l'heatre 1, 413 U.S. at 56 n.6, citing United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d
:14. :16 (2(d Cir. 1970).
I1. Smith v. California, :361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
al.o, Ross. Expert Tetimonv in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 174-177 (1966);
Stern. 'oward a Rationale for the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 20
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 527 (1968).
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community standard, it is easily understood why the Court de-
cided that there was no longer a need for an expert to explain
current outlooks on national morals and sexual trends. Arguably,
however, the application of the Court-sanctioned "state com-
munity standard" would still require that some guidance be given
to local citizens who make up the average jury. Otherwise, the
new guidelines will succeed only in reducing the task for the juror
to divining a state-wide standard of moral tolerance rather than
a national one-no small task, if indeed at all possible for a local
layman.
Private Possession of Obscenity Protected Only in the Home
In 1969, in Stanley v. Georgia,'" the Supreme Court made at
least one exception to its theory that obscene material is subject
to governmental regulation. The Court ruling in Stanley, that
private possession of obscene material in the home could not be
made a crime, was based on the theory that the first amendment
protects the right to receive ideas and information regardless of
their social worth,"' especially in the privacy of the home. Some
commentators viewed this as a step toward the liberalization of
the obscenity laws,"' for they reasoned that the right to receive
necessarily required a correlative absolute right to acquire and to
transport the material. These thoughts were quickly dispelled by
two cases, United States v. Reidel, " and United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, "1 5 which were decided in 1971.
III. :194 U.S. 557 (1969). Stanley was convicted of knowingly having possession of
)scene material in violation of a Georgia statute. The materials, three reels of film, were
seized by the police alter they had entered Stanley's home, pursuant to a search warrant,
in an attempt to discover evidence of alleged bookmaking activities. The Supreme Court
reversed the Georgia Supreme Court's atfirmance.
112. Id. at 564. This reasoning in Stanley was the first and, to date, only evidence
ota deviation from the Court's traditional approach of altogether denying obscene matter
first amendment protection. Understandably, some viewed this departure as a fatal blow
to the "two-level theory Isee note 23 supral and, if followed to its logical end, could herald
a new and more rational approach to the regulation of material dealing with sex." Com-
ment. ,Stanh'Y v. Georgia: New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 646,
649 (1,9170).
11.: See, e.g., Review of Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 147-54
(1969): Comment, Stanley v. Georgia: New Directions In Obscenity Regulation?, supra
note 112.
114. 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Reidel was convicted of knowingly using the mail to dis-
tribute obscene material, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461. Reidel had stipulated in the
advertisements soliciting orders for the materials that customers must be 21 years of age
or older. A federal district court held that § 1461 was unconstitutional as applied to the
(letendant. The Supreme Court reversed.
115. 402 U.S. :6:1 (1971). In Thirty-Seven Photographs, the materials in question
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In Reidel, the Court held that the federal government may
prohibit the commercial distribution of obscenity to willing adult
recipients (this holding thus negating any thoughts of a right to
sell or to acquire commercially), and in Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs the Court ruled that obscene material may legally be
seized through customs procedures at the port of entry when the
material is intended for commercial use. Four of the Justices"6 in
Thirty-Seven Photographs would have imposed more stringent
standards and would have ruled that the importation could be
prohibited even when the material is intended solely for private
use."1
7
The restrictive views enunciated in Reidel and Thirty-Seven
Photographs were continued by the Court in Paris Adult Theatre
I. The Court discounted the idea of a "penumbra" of constitu-
tionally protected privacy"8 for obscenity and held that the
"states have a legitimate interest . ..in regulating exhibitions
of obscene material in places of public accommodation, including
so-called adult theatres . . ... "I In Orito,120 the Court held that
the constitutionally protected zone of privacy does not extend
beyond the home, and it therefore does not cover the transporta-
tion of obscene material in common carriers in interstate com-
were seized by customs agents pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) which prohibits the
importation of obscene material. The statute was challenged for overbreadth in that it
included within its ban material protected by the privacy doctrine of Stanley. The federal
district court found the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed.
116. Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Brennan and White, J.J.
117. 402 U.S. at 376.
118. 41:3 U.S. at 66.
119. Id. at 69. Query whether the term "public accommodations" in the realm of
obscenity regulation will be interpreted by the courts the same way as in the civil rights
area. Perhaps the courts will permit litigants to carve out a "private club" exception to
that regulation.
120. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973). The prosecution was based on
knowing transportation of obscene material by common carrier in interstate commerce,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970). The relevant provisions of the statute are as
follows:
Importation or transportation of obscene matters.-Whoever brings into the
United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly uses
any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign
commerce-
(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-
picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; or
(b) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy phonograph recording, electrical
transcription, or other article or thing capable of producing sound;
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
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merce.12 ' In Twelve Two-Hundred Foot Reels,' the Court held
that Congress may prohibit the importation of obscene material,
even if it is intended for private use only.'-23
These three decisions, coupled with Reidel and Thirty-Seven
Photographs, effectively restrict the scope of Stanley to its partic-
ular facts. The Court has said that the possession of obscene
material within the home is a private matter. However, the gov-
ernment does have a right to regulate the commercial distribu-
tion, importation, and transportation of the material. The result
is that Stanley rights could be realized, as has been suggested, 2
only if one wrote or designed a tract in his attic, printed or pro-
cessed it in his basement, so as to be able to read it in his study.
The Exclusion of Obscenity From the Flow of Commerce
While re-emphasizing the importance of the states' interest
in regulating the exposure of obscene material to juveniles and
unconsenting adults,' 21 the Court stressed that these are not the
121. 413 U.S. at 142.
122. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). The United
States brought an action for forfeiture of allegedly obscene motion pictures which had
been seized in customs procedures at the time of their entry into the United States. The
seizure was made pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970). The pertinent provisions of the
statute are as follows:
Immoral articles - Importation prohibited
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any foreign
country any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print,
picture, drawing, or other representation, figure, or image on or of paper or other
material, or any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral.
Upon the appearance of any such book or matter at any customs office, the same
shall be seized and held by the collector to await the judgment of the district court
as hereinafter provided; and no protest shall be taken to the United States Customs
Court from the decision of the collector. Upon the seizure of such book or matter
the collector shall transmit information thereof to the district attorney [United
States Attorneyl of the district in which is situated the office at which such seizure
has taken place, who shall institute proceedings in the district court for the forfei-
t ire, confiscation, and destruction of the book or matter seized. Upon the adjudica-
tion that such book or matter thus seized is of the character the entry of which is
by this section prohibited, it shall be ordered destroyed and shall be destroyed.
Upon adjudication that such book or matter thus seized is not of the character the
entry of which is by this section prohibited, it shall not be excluded from entry
Linder the provisions of this section.
123. 413 U.S. at 128.
124. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
125. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49, 57, citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-20. The
protection of juveniles and unconsenting adults has traditionally been viewed as one of
the most fundamental objectives of obscenity regulation. In most instances it has gone
unchallenged, perhaps as a result of the widely held belief that children's minds are too
vulnerable to the depersonalization of sex which often forms the basic theme of obscene
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only legitimate interests which can be protected by obscenity
legislation. In Paris Adult Theatre I, the interests involved in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity' were declared
to include those "of the public in the quality of life and. the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself."'2 7 In Orito, the
federal government was found to have a similar legitimate inter-
est in protecting the public commercial environment by prevent-
ing such obscene materials from entering "the stream of com-
merce.," ,,2
The two rationales for the regulation of obscenity which are
most often asserted are the interests of society in protecting the
public decency and the possibility of anti-social behavior result-
ing from exposure to obscene materials.'29 While the Court based
its decisions on both of these rationales, it placed considerably
more emphasis upon the decency aspect than upon "adverse
effects." This lack of emphasis upon resulting anti-social behav-
ior is understandable, in that a majority of the studies by social
scientists and psychiatrists have failed to establish a definite cau-
sal connection between anti-social behavior and exposure to ob-
scenity. I'l
This lack of affirmative evidence of causality was highlighted
in the summary of findings by the United States Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography:
If a case is to be made against "pornography" in 1970, it will
have to be made on grounds other than demonstrated effects
of a damaging personal or social nature. Empirical research
designed to clarify the question has found no reliable evi-
material. See KuH, supra note 41 at 240-48. A further justification is that "objectionable"
material should not be forced upon the unwilling or the unwary.
126. 413 U.S. at 57.
127. Id. at 58.
128. 413 U.S. at 143.
129. A number of legal commentators, while recognizing both these rationales, per-
ceive the more forceful motivation to be the protection of the moral sensitivities. See, e.g.,
Henkin, supra note 24, at 391: "I believe, despite common assumptions and occasional
rationalizations, that obscenity laws are not principally motivated by any conviction that
obscene materials inspire sexual offenses. Obscenity laws, rather, are based on traditional
notions, rooted in this country's religious antecedents, of governmental responsibility for
communal and individual 'decency' and 'morality.'"
130. See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962), for an excel-
lent review by one lawyer and two behavioral scientists of the empirical evidence on the
effects of psychosexual stimuli. See also Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE
L. REV. 655, 661 (1964).
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dence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays
a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal
sexual behavior among youth or adults.' 31
The Court admitted that there is no definite proof of a connection
between anti-social behavior and obscene material, 32 but neverthe-
less maintained "that there is at least an arguable correlation be-
tween obscene material and crime.' 33 As long as this possibility of
a correlation exists, the Court will not find it unreasonable for the
federal and state legislatures to proceed upon the assumption that
there is in fact such a nexus.'34
Perhaps realizing the weakness of this argument, the Court fell
back on the decency standard and summarized its reasoning by
asserting that common sense and experience would afford "an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key rela-
tionship of human existence, central to family life, community wel-
fare, and the development of human personality, can be debased
and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex."' 35 This ap-
proach is somewhat reminiscent of Justice Stewart's "I know it
when I see it" technique, 36 and it is unfortunate that the protection
of treasured rights such as those guaranteed in the first amendment
should be based on ever varying subjective standards such as "com-
mon sense" and "experience."
OBSCENITY IN MARYLAND
An evaluation of the overall effects of the recent Supreme
Court obscenity cases on Maryland law will have to await further
action by the state courts and the legislature. To date, only one
case, Village Books, Inc. v. Marshall, 137 has been decided by the
Maryland Court of Appeals after Miller and its companion cases.
An analysis of the case presents a variety of problems, especially
131. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 169 (1970).
132. 413 U.S. at 60-61.
133. Id. at 59 & n.8. The Court based its reasoning on the HILL-LINK MINORITY
REPORT of the Obscenity Commission. See 413 U.S. at 61.
134. The nexus-no nexus debate has taken a tit-for-tat posture ever since Roth,
where Justice Harlan strongly supported the reasonableness of a nexus, 354 U.S. 476, 501-
03, and Justices Douglas and Black just as strongly criticized it, id. at 508-13. The debate
was taken up again in Memoirs, with Justice Clark advocating the possibility of a nexus,
383 U.S. 413, 451-53, and Justice Douglas once again criticizing it, id. at 431-32, n.10, with
both citing numerous surveys to support their conflicting views.
135. 413 U.S. at 63.
136. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
137. 269 Md. 748, 310 A.2d 48 (1973), petition for certiorari filed on January 7, 1974.
42 U.S.L.W. 3489 (No. 73-1060). The United States Supreme Court remanded Village
Books, 413 U.S. 911 (1973) to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which reaffirmed its original
disposition of the case, 263 Md. 76, 282 A.2d 126 (1971).
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in the areas of community standards, specificity of proscribed
conduct, and the sufficiency of the authoritative construction by
the Court of Appeals in bringing the Maryland law in line with
the Miller requirements. A review of these problems indicates
that the recent action by the Maryland Court of Appeals may
have clouded rather than clarified the obscenity issue in Mary-
land.
The general Maryland obscenity statute3 ' prohibits the sale
and distribution of "any obscene matter." While the words "mat-
ter," "person," "distribute" and "knowingly" are defined within
the statute, the key word, obscene, is not.'39 In the absence of a
legislative definition, the courts have concluded that the "Mary-
land Legislature intended by its use of the word 'obscene' to
connote that which the word 'obscene' means in prevailing lead-
ing legal thought."'4 The result, therefore, is that obscene has
been construed in Maryland to mean whatever the Supreme
Court says it means. 4' Presumably, then, the Miller test for ob-
scenity is the Maryland test.
One crucial element of the Miller standard, however, is that
state regulation be limited "to works which depict or describe
sexual conduct . . . specifically defined by the applicable state
138. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418 (1971):
§ 418. Sending or bringing into State for sale or distribution; publishing etc.,
within State.
Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be
brought, into this State for sale or distribution, or in this State prepares, publishes,
prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with the
intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
139. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 417 (1971):
§ 417. Definitions.
As used in this subtitle,
(1) "Matter" means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written
material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial
representation or any statue or other figure, or any recording, transcription or
mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment,
machines or materials.
(2) "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or
other legal entity, but shall not be construed to include an employee of any individ-
ual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity operating a
theatre which shows motion pictures if the employee is not an officer thereof or has
no financial interest therein other than receiving salary and wages.
(3) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of, whether with or without considera-
tion.
(4) "Knowingly" means having knowledge of the character and content of the
subject matter.
140. Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 205, 273 A.2d 436, 439 (1971).
141. Id.
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law, as written or authoritatively construed."'' Although
sufficient specificity is contained in one Code section which deals
with the sale and distribution of obscene matter to minors,14 the
specific definitions of that section do not apply to the general
obscenity statute and indeed could not, since there is no mention
of "sexual conduct" in section 418. As a result, the statute as
written is lacking the specificity required by the Miller Court.
This inadequacy was not corrected by the Court of Appeals in
Village Books.
In Village Books, the trial judge, in an oral opinion, asserted
that the material was to be judged by the contemporary com-
munity standards of Prince George's County.' Finding the mate-
rials obscene, he then issued an order enjoining their sale and
directing their destruction, pursuant to a provision of the obscen-
ity statute."' On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
142. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
143. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 416A (Supp. 1973):
§ 416A. Definitions.
The following words and phrases, as used in this subheading, have the mean-
ings indicated:
(b) Minor means any person under eighteen years of age.
(c) Sadomasochistic abuse means flagellation or torture by or upon a human who
is nude, or clad in undergarments, or in a revealing or bizarre costume, or the
condition of one who is nude or so clothed and is being fettered, bound, or otherwise
physically restrained.
(d) Sexual conduct means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touch-
ing of or contact with the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or
female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same
or opposite sex, or between humans and animals.
(e) Sexual excitement means the condition of human male or female genitals, or
the breasts of the female, when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
144. The opinion is reproduced in Brief for Appellants at E. 31, Village Books, Inc.
v. Marshall, 263 Md. 76, 282 A.2d 126 (1971):
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has never defined what community is
involved in defining "community standards" I suppose it would be desirable for this
Court to make some determination. When I speak of "community" I mean the same
community from which jurors are drawn to decide any factual issues involved in
any cases in this court. Therefore, I am speaking of Prince George's County, which
is the same area from which jurors are drawn to sit in cases in this County. And I
conclude and find that this material is patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary standards in Prince George's County ....
145. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418A (1971):
§ 418A. Injunctive remedy.
The circuit courts of the counties and the equity courts of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City have jurisdiction to enjoin the sale or distribution of any book,
magazine, or any other publication or article (including a motion picture film or
showing) which is prohibited from sale or distribution, as hereinafter specified.
1. The State's attorneys of the counties and Baltimore City in which a person,
firm or corporation sells or distributes or is about to sell or distribute or has in his
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court's decision without mentioning community standards al-
though the appellant contended, inter alia, that the trial court's
use of a county community standard constituted reversible
error.'46 The appellant again questioned the validity of the county
standard in its petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari.'41 The
possession with intent to sell or distribute or is about to acquire possession with
intent to sell or distribute any book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper,
writing paper, picture, card, drawing or photograph (including a motion picture
film or showing) or any article or instrument of use which is obscene, within the
meaning of § 418 of this article may maintain an action for an injunction against
such person, firm or corporation in the circuit court of the counties or the equity
courts of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City to prevent the sale or further sale
or the distribution or further distribution or the acquisition, publication or posses-
sion within this State of any book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper,
writing paper, picture, card, drawing or photograph (including a motion picture
film or showing), or any article or instrument of use which is obscene.
3. In the event that an order or judgment be entered in favor of the State's
attorney and against the person, firm or corporation sought to be enjoined, such
final order or judgment shall contain a provision directing the person, firm or
corporation to surrender to such peace officer as the court may direct or to the
sheriff of the county in which the action was brought any of the matter described
in this section and such sheriff or officer shall be directed to seize and destroy the
same ....
146. The Appellants' other contentions were the following:
(1) Was Appellee required to produce expert testimony to establish the alleged
obscenity of the eighteen books and magazines held obscene by the court below?
(3) Was it necessary for Appellee to introduce testimony that the books and maga-
zines were to be exhibited or sold to juveniles, advertised obtrusively, or pandered,
to sustain a finding of obscenity if the questioned literary materials did not consti-
tute hard-core pornography?
(4) Is the statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418A, unconstitutional because it
denies Appellants a trial by jury on the issue of obscenity and allows an ex parte
prior restraint of literary material?
The Attorney General in voicing his support of the local community standard stated:
Community standards, as set forth by Judge Powers, the trial judge below, include
those contemporary community standards of candor in the expression of sexual
matters in erotic literature which are found in Prince George's County, Maryland.
This is the area over which the Court has jurisdiction and from which it draws its
jurors. Until such time as the United States Supreme Court determines otherwise,
the State of Maryland has determined that the community standards of the court's
own community will govern. Consequently, Judge Powers was correct in applying
the community standards of candor as they prevail in Prince George's County.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Village Books, Inc. v. Marshall, 263 Md. 76, 282 A.2d 126 (1971).
147. The other questions presented for review were the following:
(2) Are the five magazines, "Sex Confidential," "Masturbation and Youth," "Auto
Fellatio and Masturbation," "Ted and Blair," and "Allen and Jim," obscene in the
constitutional sense without sales or exhibition to juveniles, obtrusive advertising
or pandering? and
(3) Is the statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418A unconstitutional as allowing an
ex parte prior restraint of literary material and denying a trial by jury on the issue
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Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Miller v.
California .... "148
In a memorandum filed in support of reaffirmance on re-
mand, the Attorney General argued that a state-wide standard is
the appropriate community standard;'49 he apparently reversed
his prior support of a "local community" standard. 5 ' The Attor-
ney General noted that, although the trial court judge had used
a county-wide standard in deciding the case, reversal was not
required since the Court of Appeals in its initial review "used a
state-wide standard of obscenity as expressed by the United
States Supreme Court to be applied across the state as a
whole."'' A careful reading of the Court of Appeal's original opin-
ion, however, reveals no mention of community standards, and
indeed its affirmance would indicate at least silent approval of
the trial judge's use of the county as the proper community.
The Attorney General also argued that Miller did not require
the Court of Appeals to give an authoritative definition of specifi-
cally proscribed sexual conduct. The State reasoned that Mary-
land's definition of obscene is that of "the prevailing leading legal
thought."'' 2 Since Chief Justice Burger had indicated that the
Supreme Court was "prepared"'' 3 to construe the word obscene
in federal statutes to incorporate the examples of sexual conduct
given in Miller, the same construction would automatically apply
to the Maryland statute and therefore would give it the specificity
required under the new guidelines.
The Court of Appeals responded to the remand of Village
Books and the Attorney General's memorandum as follows:
"[Tihis Court has reconsidered its opinion and judgment in light
of the cases set forth above [Miller, et al.] and finds that the
opinion and judgment should be reaffirmed. . . .."I This action
indicates the court's belief that the Maryland statute, as written
and presently construed, will pass muster under the new Supreme
of obscenity?
Reproduced in the Memorandum in support of reaffirmance at 3-4, filed August, 1973 by
the Attorney General of Maryland to the Maryland Court of Appeals in Village Books,
Inc. v. Marshall [hereinafter cited as Memo.].
148. 413 U.S. 911 (1973).
149. Memo. at 10-15.
150. See note 11 supra.
151. Memo, at 14-15.
152. See note 5 supra.
153. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
154. Village Books, Inc. v. Marshall, 413 U.S. 911 (1973).
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Court guidelines. However, the court's failure to proscribe spe-
cific sexual conduct militates against the continued constitution-
ality of the Maryland general obscenity statute.
While the Court of Appeals gave no reasoning for its decision,
it can be contended that, by reconsidering and reaffirming Village
Books in light of Miller, the Court intended to incorporate af-
firmatively the Supreme Court's new standards into Maryland
law, sub silentio. This silent incorporation, however, without
more, would seem to lack the required specificity. Presumably,
the Court of Appeals accepted the Attorney General's analysis
and viewed the two examples of sexual conduct set forth in Miller
as being sufficient to provide specificity in the Maryland statute.
If indeed this is the basis of the Court's action, its approach is
faulty in several respects.
The Supreme Court in Miller required the states to define
specifically what sexual conduct, when described or depicted,
would warrant a finding of obscenity. While noting that it "must
leave to State Courts the construction of state legislation ... ,"I"
the Court, in an effort to give some guidance to the states, gave
"a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for
regulation. . . . ,,51 The Court in no way authoritatively incorpo-
rated the examples into the overall guidelines. The Court did
mention in a footnote that if and when it is faced with a serious
doubt concerning the constitutionality of a federal statute be-
cause of "the vagueness of the words 'obscene,' 'lewd,' 'lasci-
vious,' 'filthy,' 'indecent,' or 'immoral,'" it was "prepared to con-
strue" the words as limited to "that specific 'hard core' sexual
conduct given as examples in Miller v. California . . . ."'I The
Court was not actually presented with the issue of the definitional
sufficiency of the words, and, therefore, this statement is at best
dictum. Since this cannot be viewed even as a present
authoritative construction of the word obscene for specificity pur-
poses with regard to the federal statutes, it is impossible to see
how it can be incorporated into the Maryland standard as a re-
flection of "the prevailing leading legal thoughts."
It thus seems that the Maryland Court of Appeals, by incor-
porating only the general guidelines for the regulation of obscen-
ity, failed to provide an authoritative construction which would
have preserved the validity of the current Maryland statute. The
155. 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
156. 413 U.S. at 25 (1973).
157. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 130 n.7 (1973).
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court could have supplied the required specificity through con-
struction by merely including verbatim the examples of sexual
conduct cited in Miller.'55 A variety of other states have been
158. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals took this approach in a recent case
which dealt with the State's power to regulate the exhibition of motion picture films.
Ebert v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 313 A.2d 536 (1973). Ebert,
as agent for Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Stereo), submitted
thirty peep show films to the Maryland State Board of Censors for approval and licensing
in accordance with the provisions of the Maryland Annotated Code, article 66A. The
relevant portions are as follows:
§ 2. Unlawful to show any but approved and licensed film.
It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture film
or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been
submitted . . . and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State
Board of Censors, ... hereinafter in this article called the Board.
§ 6. Board to examine, approve or disapprove films; what films to be disap-
proved.
(a) [Tihe Board shall examine . . . all films . . and shall disapprove such
as are obscene ....
(b) [Flor the purposes of this article, a motion picture film or view shall be
considered to be obscene if, when considered as a whole, its calculated pur-
pose or dominant effect is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the
probability of this effect is so great as to outweigh whatever other merits the
film may possess.
§ 19. Review and approval or disapproval of film by Board; judicial determina-
tion; appeal ....
(a) Any film duly submitted to the Board for examination and licensing shall
be reviewed and approved within five (5) days, unless the Board shall disap-
prove such films under the provisions of § 6 hereof, in which event the Board
shall, within not later than three (3) days thereafter, apply to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City for a judicial determination as to whether such film
is obscene. . . . If the [Circuit Court'sl decree and order disapproves said
film as being in violation of the provisions of § 6 hereof, then the person
presenting such film for licensing may appeal such determination to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ....
The films were disapproved by the Board and application was made to the Circuit
Court for a judicial determination of the obscenity issue. The Board's evidence at the
Circuit Court consisted entirely of the films themselves. Stereo's evidence included the
testimony of an expert witness in the field of human sexuality. The expert testified that
in his opinion the films were not obscene (using a national community standard) and were
not utterly without redeeming social value. The expert also testified that he could not
define hard core pornography. 19 Md. App. at 316-17, 313 A.2d at 545-46. The Circuit
Court found the films to be obscene and ordered that they be disapproved. Stereo then
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
In vacating and remanding the case for a rehearing at the Circuit Court level, the
Court of Special Appeals reviewed the recent Supreme Court obscenity decisions and
Maryland precedent, and it authoritatively construed the Maryland movie censorship
statute to bring it into conformity with the new obscenity guidelines. The court noted that
the definition of obscene embodied in article 66A, section 6(b) had been declared to be
unconstitutionally broad, and that "the standard of obscenity is limited to what can be
deemed obscene in the constitutional sense." 19 Md. App. at 313, 313 A.2d at 543, citing
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faced with the same Miller-created problems, but, unlike the
situation resulting from the court's disposition of Village Books,
they have reached conclusions which are constitutionally sound.
An Indiana case, Mohney v. State, ' is closely analcgous to
Village Books. Both cases were before the Supreme Court on cer-
tiorari and were vacated and remanded in light of Miller. Like the
Maryland statute, the Indiana obscenity statute does not define
"obscene," and uses the prevalent Supreme Court definition.
However, the Indiana Supreme Court, noting that the statute
"doesn't set out specifically the sexual or obscene acts which
. . . constitute a violation of the statute,"'10 held their statute to
be unconstitutional.
Other states present a variety of resolutions. In State u. J-R
Distributors,' the Washington Supreme Court construed an ob-
scenity statute similar to Maryland's by specifically defining pro-
scribed sexual conduct. In Papp v. State, 12 a Florida intermedi-
ate appellate court construed Florida's obscenity statute in the
same way, but the court applied it only prospectively. The court
held that the judicial limitation of the obscenity statute denied
Dunn v. Board of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 252-54, 213 A.2d 751, 752-53 (1965).
The Court found that a review of the Miller decision clearly indicated that the Su-
preme Court was equating obscene material with hard core pornography, 19 Md. App. at
305, 313 A.2d at 539, and that a state community standard was permissible in determining
obscenity, id. at 309, 313 A.2d at 541-42 n.8.
Noting that the "Court of Appeals of Maryland has declared that the clear legislative
intent was to authorize the Board 'to disapprove films which are obscene by any valid test
S. . ,'" Id. at 314, 313 A.2d at 543, citing Sanza v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 245 Md.
319, 339, 226 A.2d 317, 327-28 (1967), the Court construed the word obscene "as used in
article 66A in light of [Miller]" and therefore determined that the statute, as now con-
strued, requires that the Board disapprove any film which:
(1) portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way in that it contains patently
offensive:
(a) representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated; OR
(b) representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibitions of genitals; AND
(2) taken as a whole:
(a) would be found by the average person, applying contemporary community
standards of the State, to appeal to the prurient interest in sex; AND
(b) does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
19 Md. App. at 314-15, 313 A.2d at 544-45.
This construction is a verbatim incorporation of the examples given by the Supreme
Court in Miller, 413 U.S. at 25, and it provides the movie censorship statute with the
specificity required for constitutionality.
159. - Ind. __, 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973).
160. Id.
161. 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973).
162. 281 So.2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 4th Dist. 1973).
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Papp due process, since it failed to give him adequate notice of
the proscribed conduct at the time of the offense. An intermedi-
ate appellate court in California, in People v. Enskat, " held that
the state obscenity statute had previously been authoritatively
construed to reach only "graphic descriptions of sexual activity,"
including specific sexual acts.'64 While this list of state rulings is
not exhaustive, it demonstrates a wide range of responsible judi-
cial reaction to Miller, by which Miller's specificity mandate is
authoritatively and conclusively met.
While the Supreme Court in Miller established overall guide-
lines for the regulation of obscenity, it affirmatively cast upon the
states the responsibility of ascertaining the parameters of com-
munity tolerance and of articulating in specific detail sexual con-
duct, the depiction of which will transgress these parameters and
will thus justify proscription. By vacating and remanding Village
Books, the Supreme Court presented the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals with an obvious opportunity to fulfill its task of providing
the required specificity by authoritatively construing the current
Maryland obscenity statute. The Court of Appeal's failure to
meet this responsibility renders the present Maryland obscenity
statute constitutionally deficient in light of Miller.
CONCLUSION
While the intent of the Supreme Court to create order out of
chaos in the area of obscenity' was laudable, its success will
163. 33 Cal. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Ct. of Appeals, 4th Dist. 1973).
164. Id. at 909, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
165. The Court may be unintentionally setting an example of appellate inaction, for
in none of the five cases did the Court hold that the material involved was obscene,
although it intimated that the material was hard core. Surely, with respect to the "pru-
rient interest" standard and the "patently offensive" standard, if the mores of the local
community are to be used, only a clearly erroneous standard of review is available. How-
ever, with respect to the element of "lacks serious literary value," the Court may be
reviewing more extensively, premising its review upon a "Constitutional fact" basis as in
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 232 (1972) (per curiam).
But, the Court apparently intends to take an active role. Ascribing to the new stan-
dards a quality of "concreteness" lacking since Roth, Chief Justice Burger in Miller noted
that the road in the future for the Court may be rough, but that each case must be decided
on its own facts. See 413 U.S. at 29-30. With a majority of Justices agreeing on one
standard, the Chief Justice feels confident that most cases-although not the borderline
ones-can be disposed of by a few "model" decisions which will indicate what this "fin
de siecle" Court considers to be obscene.
A docket currently crowded with obscenity decisions provides the Court with an
opportunity to clarify many of the ambiguities of the Miller guidelines. The following are
among the questions presented: (1) the specificity of the definition of "sexual conduct"
in a state statute. (J.R. Distributors, Inc. v. Washington, 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049
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probably prove to be worthy of considerably less praise. Through
the continued use of such standards as "patently offensive,"
"prurient appeal," and "lacks serious value," the Court perpetu-
ated the much criticized subjective nature of the old standard. By
denying first amendment protection to privately possessed ob-
scene material outside the home, the Court-sanctioned right to
possess the material in the home is rendered almost meaningless.
By allowing determinations of obscenity to be made on a basis
other than a national standard of decency, with its concommitant
varieties of standards and divergence of state responses, the
Court continued the need for a case-by-case review to ensure the
protection of first amendment rights. All of these failings can be
traced to the recurring basic problem of imposing regulations
upon obscenity without first answering adequately the following
two questions: What is it that is being regulated,'66 and why does
it need to be regulated? Until the Court satisfactorily deals with
these basic threshold inquiries, all its efforts, no matter how well
intentioned, will be doomed to failure.
(1973), petition for certiorari filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3391 (No. 73-937)) (in particular, whether
a state court may authoritatively construe broad state statute. See 512 P.2d at 1060,
dissent at 1091-92). (2) The use of state or local community standards. (local standards
-Trinker v. Alabama, Ala. Ct. of Crim. App. (6/29/73), petition for certiorari filed,
11/28/73, 42 U.S.L.W. 3453 (No. 73-844)). (state standards-J.R. Distributors, Inc., 512
P.2d at 1065). (3) Definition of "lacks serious literary, etc. value" (Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894, (6th Cir. 1973), cert, granted, 2/19/74, 42 U.S.L.W.
3468 (No. 73-1004). (Issue presented-"Is play 'Hair' obscene for purposes of denial of use
of municipal auditorium?"). (See 486 F.2d at 897, 898, 899, 903-04. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognizes that a play is distinct from literature because conduct as well
as words are used.) (4) Definition of "taken as a whole". Id. (5) Constitutionality of federal
obscenity law (Brown v. United States, __ F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973), petition for certior-
ari filed 11/15/73, 42 U.S.L.W. 3443 (No. 73-788); constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1462.).
166. Judge Learned Hand's attempt to answer this question provides perhaps the
most eloquent judicial effort to date: "If there be no abstract definition, such as I have
suggested, should not the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point
in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived
here and now?" United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Standards
however, not eloquence, decide cases; and Judge Hand's eventual recognition of the need
for a more objective standard, one capable of definite (if discreet) measurement, is re-
flected in the following comment by Kuh:
Long years after this decision, in an off-the-bench comment, a much older Learned
Hand, whose lusty humor provided relief from the majesty commanded by his
appearance, his manner and his incisive mind, was to suggest that the appropriate
judicial test for obscenity was to see whether the disputed matter physically
aroused the judge, not any judge, but an exceedingly old, old- old one.
KUH, supra note 41, at 23.
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